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ABSTRACT: This paper presents the development of a model to assess the reliability of
helicopter main gearbox (MGB) lubricating systems. The loss of oil from a helicopter MGB
will lead to increased friction between components, a rise in component surface temperatures,
and subsequent mechanical failure of gearbox components. A number of significant helicopter
accidents have been caused due to such loss of lubrication. Current certification requirements
for Category A helicopters require that gearboxes which use pressurized lubrication systems
must show a capability to continue operation for a period of 30 minutes after suffering a loss of
oil.
This paper reports on methods for assessing reliability of pressurized MGB lubrication systems.
Safety risk modeling was conducted for MGB oil system related accidents and incidents in order
to analyse the key failure mechanisms and the contributory factors. As such, the dominant
failure modes for lubrication systems and key contributing components were identified. The
Influence Diagram (ID) approach was then employed to investigate reliability issues of the
MGB lubrication systems at the level of primary causal factors. Early indications show
significant benefits from this approach where multiple influences would render alternative
approaches overly complex. The ID tool can systematically investigate complex context of
events, conditions, and influences that are direct triggers of failures. Within this study, an ID
model was introduced to describe the interrelationships between MGB lubrication system failure
types. In this way the influence of each of these factors on the overall MGB lubrication system
reliability may be assessed.
KEYWORDS: Helicopter main gearbox lubrication; Lubrication system failures; Influence
diagrams
1 INTRODUCTION
Helicopters are totally dependent on their rotor transmission (RT) systems, which provide the
critical links from the engines to the main rotor, tail rotor and ancillary systems. These
components are highly loaded and must be manufactured to a high degree of accuracy; the lack
of redundancy implies that this is a ‘series-chain’ system (Astridge 1996, Savage et al 1988).
These RT systems are in turn totally dependent on a functioning lubrication system. The loss
of oil from a helicopter Main gearbox (MGB), which is a central system within a helicopter, will
lead to mechanical failure of the gearbox components. Current certification requirements for
Category A helicopters (large helicopters) require that gearboxes which use pressurized
lubrication systems must show a capability to continue operation for a period of 30 minutes after
suffering a loss of oil (EASA 2012). However, this has not always been met in service with
current designs. Many Category A helicopters fly sectors which are over one hour in duration
and in the event of a main gearbox loss of oil could require a forced landing over hostile terrain.
There have been a number of significant accidents involving the loss of helicopters due to a
failure of the Main gearbox lubrication system. A particular case in point was the crash of a
large helicopter off the coast of Newfoundland in 2009 (TSB 2010).
This paper explains the use of Influence Diagrams (ID) to supplement the traditional Fault or
Event Trees. Analysis of causal factors will often allow a Fault Tree model to be produced as
far as the data allow. However there are many factors that relate to management, organization
and culture that cannot be clearly included as “events”. The same can also be said for many
physical degradation processes which affect systems (including gearboxes), for instance; wear,
corrosion and fatigue. The actual failure itself may be an “event”, but there is a whole process
that leads up to it, with many different influences.
The ID approach to system reliability assessment is a detailed probabilistic safety assessment
technique that represents the factors influencing reliability of the system under study. A generic
model of accident causation was proposed by Embrey (1992) which showed a combination of
Event and Likelihood/Influences layers, see Figure 1. This approach, entitled MACHINE1
featured two distinct layers, namely Event layer and Likelihood (Influence) layer, hence the
term Event-likelihood model (Kumamoto and Henley 1996).
Figure 1 - Generic Influence Diagram model for accident causation (Embrey 1992)
As Figure 1 indicates, the ID concept is introduced to tackle multi-dimensional complex
problems which involve internal mutual interference of factors that collectively produce a single
overall event. It works to link qualitative description of complex technical problems, and their
quantitative specifications. This approach “can serve the three levels of specification of relation,
function, and number” (Embrey 1992) of involved factors, and it works in both deterministic
and probabilistic cases.
Hokstad et al, 1999, Hokstad et al 2001, Herrera et al. 2010, used the ID approach to assess
risks associated with operating helicopters over the North Sea. The approach, with its ability to
1 Model of Accident Causation using Hierarchical Influence Network Elicitation
represent both technical and management issues, can be used for assessing reliabilities of a wide
variety of systems. A further example is in the domain of Air traffic management in which an
Integrated Risk Picture was created (Eurocontrol, 2006). This used a combination of Fault tree
analysis and ID to estimate risk due to errors that can influence five different accident types.
More details on the development and use of IDs are available within these references. Detailed
ID mathematical model is given by (Embrey 1992) for further reference as well.
The MGB lubrication system designs of various helicopter types are different with respect to
component layout, structures, redundancy and detailed performance specifications. This
variation in designs emphasizes the need for a generic model to accommodate the differences
between designs. This study introduces such a generic ID component-based model. The
approach taken allows more flexibility than other techniques that are available e.g. fault tree
analysis, and can easily be reconfigured in the light of new information or data.
2 METHODOLOGY
This paper reports on a method for assessing the reliability of pressurized lubrication systems,
and summarises the dominant failure modes. The Influence Diagram approach was applied to
investigate the reliability of the MGB pressurized lubrication system, and the role each sub-
system component may play to influence the overall reliability. Three main activities are
conducted and discussed within this research and Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of the work.
Results obtained from these activities are discussed to set the basis for both prevention and
mitigation techniques in regard to MGB lubrication system failure.
i. Literature review covering aspects of MGB design and architecture, lubrication, failure
diagnostics and prognostics, reliability and testing.
ii. Determination of MGB lubrication systems failure triggers and failure modes, and other
failure contributing factors through fault trees analysis, and by consulting industry experts.
iii. Investigation of the MGB lubrication system reliability at the sub-system level using ID
concept.
Within the current research, an ID model is formulated to evaluate the effect of different
design and maintenance factors on the overall performance of the MGB oil system. The aim is
to introduce a generic tool, based on authenticated evidence, which can be used to evaluate the
helicopter MGB lubrication system at a given set of inputs. A failure is considered to have
occurred if any of the associated factors (events, conditions, or influences) exist at any given
time during the MGB lubrication system operation.
Once the model is constructed, simulations can be performed to assess the relative impact of
the underlying factors. This simulation is demonstrated in the paper using two underlying, or
so-called “Primary factors”, namely Maintenance procedures and Human error. The respective
influence factors have been estimated for the demonstration of the model’s functionality.
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Figure 2 Research methodology - Sequence of activities
The pressurized lubrication system of helicopter MGB can be represented by three
interlinked functions, namely lubrication of moving component, dissipation of heat produced
due to friction and monitoring of the lubrication system. Accordingly, for the purposes of this
study, a failure of the MGB lubrication system is considered to have occurred if at least one of
these three functions fails. The latter can fail, individually or collectively, in four ways:
i. Inadequate quality of the MGB lubrication system oil.
ii. Inadequate quantity of the MGB lubrication system oil.
iii. Inadequate pressure value of the MGB lubrication system oil flow.
iv. Failure of the facility for providing monitoring, caution, or warning information
regarding the MGB lubrication system operation.
3 MAIN GEARBOX SYSTEM FAILURES
3.1 MGB design and failure aspects
Literature rarely identifies detailed mechanisms for MGB lubrication system failures as per
their root causes or modes of occurrence. Astridge (1989) performed detailed analysis of
accidents and found the rotor-transmission (RT) system to be a major source of airworthiness
related accidents and unreliability. Gears, lubricating system components, bearings and
freewheels are the major risk-associated internal parts of the transmission. Astridge summarised
the key MGB and lubrication system design features as:
Data from accident reports
i. Oil recirculation with redundancy / emergency features.
ii. Minimization of pipework external to the gearbox,
iii. Effective oil content measurement.
iv. Oil filtration and wear debris capture provisions.
v. Tooth design for spiral bevel gears to ensure gear separation (not pulling into mesh).
vi. Solid ground spacers or shims are preferred to soft aluminum laminated shims.
vii. Effective means for detecting bearing roller contact fatigue
Data from overhaul information
i. Importance of adequate condition monitoring of MGB parts during overhauls.
ii. Corrosion of gears, bearings and shafts.
iii. Micropitting of gears teeth
iv. Debris damage (crater in raceways) caused by rolled-in debris.
v. Sight glass staining.
vi. Human error.
In the analysis sequence, the events were traced in detail from their origins until the point at
which the MGB lubrication system ceased operation. The output of this analysis helped to
understand the various failure scenarios and mechanisms that the MGB lubrication system can
suffer as a result of different inputs (e.g. design errors, mechanical failures, oil quality, human
inputs etc). This analysis has been used to design the influence diagrams to represent the
problem being studied.
3.2 Determining primary and secondary failures of MGB oil system
A thorough search of relevant helicopter accidents and incidents formal reports involving
MGB lubrication systems was conducted via various available databases and other data sources.
A total of 10 reports were selected out of initial screening input of 1232 reports from sources
shown in Table 1.
Table 1 - Data mining of helicopter accidents formal reports: screening and selection process
Authority
Reports from
initial screening
Reviewed
reports
Reports
selected for analysis
AAIB (UK) 206 55 4
TSB (Canada) 115 15 4
ATSB (Australia) 179 23 1
NTSB (USA) 713 78 1
BEA (France) 16 16
Others 3 3
Total 1232 190 10
Ten selected reports were analyzed using fault tree methodology to identify primary and
secondary modes of failure of the MGB lubrication systems. The basic aim of performing this
fault tree analysis was to get detailed understanding of triggers, causes and event sequences for
these accidents and incidents. The analysis showed that although some similarities exist in
some events, the overall sequence, nature and importance of each event was found to be
different. In the analysis sequence, the events were traced in detail from their origins until the
point at which the MGB lubrication system ceased operation.
The output of this analysis helped to understand the various failure scenarios and mechanisms
that the MGB lubrication system can suffer as a result of different inputs (e.g. design errors,
mechanical failures, oil quality, human inputs etc). The analysis has been used to design the
influence diagrams to represent the problem being studied. A detailed listing of the primary and
secondary failures and faults found through this analysis is given in Table 2.
Table 2 - Primary and secondary failures and faults based on selected MGB oil system accidents and incidents
Case Description Primary failures / faults Secondary failures / faults Effects / External qualifiers
1 Total loss of MGB oil
due to failure of oil filter
bowl.
Galling of the titanium studs Fracture of first stud, followed by second stud
and loss of MGB oil from oil filter bowl.
Increased removal / installation cycles of studs.
Improper pre-load installation of studs.
Increased cyclic loads on studs during flight.
2 Failed MGB oil pump Oil pump idler gear seized. Oil pump drive shaft separated at mid span
(Overstressed in torsion). Power to oil pump lost
Total loss of MGB oil pressure
High temperature overstress damage of teeth of
combining gearbox input gears (from engines).
Continued MGB operation after loss of oil
pressure.
MGB - Engine combining gearbox failed (Torque drive to MGB bevel gear is reduced)
Incorrect human input MGB low oil pressure indicator bulb was
removed before flight
Human individual and organizational errors
No oil pressure readings were provided to pilot (Service Bulletin to install a MGB oil pressure gauge
was not implemented)
3 Normal flow of MGB oil
obstructed due to
incorrect positioning of
input quill bearing
housing
Incorrectly installed MGB
input quill bearing
Bearing housing rotated 90 degrees clockwise in
relation to MGB oil input and output ports)
Multiple maintainer errors
No oil flow to MGB input quill bearing
High temperature skewing failure of input quill
bearings (parts jam when cage fails).
Continued MGB operation with no oil flow to
bearing.
Sudden stoppage of main gearbox.
4 Seizure of MGB pinion
outer bearing due to oil
starvation
Debris dropped into the MGB
oil gallery
Oil gallery feeding the outer bearing of MGB
input pinion was blocked
Multiple human individual errors.
No oil flow to MGB input pinion bearing
High temperature skewing failure of input pinion
outer bearing (bearing parts jam when cage fails).
Continued MGB operation with no oil flow to
bearing.
Intermittent binding of MGB input pinion outer
bearing
Intermittent stoppage of the MGB.
5 Failure of MGB rear
bearing due to
inadequate lubrication
Low Quantity of MGB oil was
available before flight start.
Poor quality of MGB oil
Poor lubrication of the rear MGB bearing Human individual error
High temperature skewing failure of rear MGB
bearing (bearing case broken)
Continued MGB operation with no oil flow to
bearing.
Rear MGB bearing seized (rollers jammed sideways)
Output pinion shaft turning in the inner race of seized rear bearing produced high temperature
Hardened skin of the pinion shaft was softened; Slackness of shaft produced multiple fatigue cracks
Fracture in torsion of the MGB pinion shaft at rear end of the MGB
Damage to the flexible coupling at the forward part of the tail drive shaft
Case Description Primary failures / faults Secondary failures / faults Effects / External qualifiers
6 Loss of MGB oil due to
MGB case rupture
MGB outer case fracture Loss of MGB oil pressure
Extensive leak (loss) of MGB oil Failed 2nd stage epicyclic planet gear. Non-oil
system failure.
Loss of MGB oil pressure
7 Loss of MGB oil due to
MGB case rupture
MGB input casing fracture Extensive leak (loss) of MGB oil Failed 1st stage of No. 1 spur gear. Non-oil
system failure. External technical and human
inputs
Fracture of first stud.
8 Total loss of MGB oil
due to fracture of oil
filter bowl.
Galling of the titanium studs Fracture of second stud. Stud was repaired just before the flight
Increased removal / installation cycles of studs.
Increased cyclic loads on studs during flight.
Loss of MGB oil from oil filter bowl. Increased load on the 2nd stud
Increased removal / installation cycles of studs.
Increased cyclic loads on studs during flight.
The bearing adjacent carbon seal broke down.
9 Failure of the plain
bearing in the main
gearbox cover for the
number 1 input pinion.
The plain bearing in the main
gearbox cover for the number
1 input pinion failed
Bearing lost lubrication (grease), and disintegrated.
Oil spray out from the MGB on to the pinion shaft
The number 1 pinion rapidly overheated and weakened.
Local fire started at base of transmission Continued MGB operation after loss of oil.
Rotational imbalance due to bearing fracture.
Fracture of the No 1 pinion.
Malfunction of the No. 1 free wheel unit
Wear of internal parts of IFWU
10 The input freewheel unit
(IFWU) and drive shaft
assembly failed.
Contamination suspended
and trapped in the lubricating
oil of the MGB input free
wheel unit (IFWU)
MGB IFWU failed. Repeated heavy lift operations.
Inadequate human input (maintenance)
Failure of drive to MGB
4 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF GEARBOX LUBRICATION SYSTEM
4.1 Development of Influence Diagram
It is challenging to set weightings to the impacts of each type of failure on each of the
MGB functions. This is due to the complex nature of the mechanisms through which there
failure type initiate and propagate. For instance a single event of oil loss from the lubrication
system can trigger almost all of the four types of failure to varying degrees. The MGB
lubrication system ID model is constructed from various resources, including:
 Relevant helicopter MGB’s design specifications and architecture, with emphasize on
lubrication system components
 MGB lubrication system related formal accident reports.
 Findings of relevant accidents analyses using fault tree technique.
 Published literature on MGB lubrication system designs, structures, and failure modes.
 Published literature on gearbox lubrication and gear failure diagnostics and prognostics
 Industry consultation and expert opinion.
The ID model for helicopter MGB lubrication system function failure analysis is given in
Figure 3. The factors and inter-relationships shown have been identified from detailed study
of accident reports and other technical sources. MGB lubrication system failure is the main
event (Level A) triggered by the occurrence of any or all of the four main failure types of the
lubrication system (Level B). The latter are influenced by 10 main influencing factors at level
C, and below this at level D, a total of 15 primary factors exist which are the initial failure
triggers. This level generally lists the overall components of the MGB lubrication system, in
addition to the influences of human individual and organizational behaviour.
It should be noted that not all of the 15 Primary factors are of a purely technical nature. In
fact the first one is the Maintenance procedures adopted for a given MGB lubrication
system. This is a critical input to the integrity and operation of the system through both
scheduled and reactive maintenance activities. Another external input to the MGB
lubrication system reliability is the human activities carried on the system during
maintenance or operation (e.g. walk-around checks errors). The evidence collected shows
that both of these inputs play a significant role in the system reliability.
4.2 Types of input to model
The primary factors are represented at any given time by 15 different initial probability
values which represent the likelihood of such factors occurring. The next step is the degree
of influence that each of the primary factors on the relevant main factors of Level C. Subject
matter experts could be employed for this important step, which is to gauge the relative
importance of the varying factors. For this model, the three sources of input data are
historical data of previous events, subject matter experts and simulated data
A similar process is adopted at all four levels of the model in Figure 3, with the inputs for
each level being fed from the outputs from the level below. The model can further provide
for other detailed analyses of the lubrication system as will be discussed in the following
sections.
Figure 3 - Influence Diagram for helicopter MGB lubrication system function failure analysis
5 RESULTS
5.1 Component-based reliability analysis
To demonstrate the model, one of the Main influencing factors at Level C examined is Oil
source quality. The latter is influenced by two Primary factors, Maintenance procedures and
Human error. For each set of influences, a truth table (Table 3) is set up based on the different
combinations of contributory factors, using input probability values. This will give the different
possible outcomes and the ensuing influence on the likelihood that Oil source quality will be
compromised. In the first case, the probability of maintenance procedures being correct is 0.8
and the probability of no human error is 0.9.
For this example these events are assumed to be independent, although it may be suggested
that this need not be the case. Hence the combined probability of correct procedures and no
human error is 0.8 x 0.9 = 0.72. In this case it is viewed that the influence factor is 0.1, i.e. there
is still a finite chance that despite correct maintenance procedures and faultless human actions,
the oil source could still be degraded. The same process is adopted for the other three possible
combinations. The influence factors may be changed depending on the prior knowledge of the
program user, or other external data source.
Table 3 – Influencing factors for Oil Source quality
Maintenance procedures Human error Oil source quality
Input probability Input probability Influence factor Prob of poor quality
Correct 0.8 Does not occur 0.9 0.1 0.8 x 0.9 x 0.1 = 0.072
Correct 0.8 Does occur 0.1 0.3 0.8 x 0.1 x 0.3 = 0.024
Incorrect 0.2 Does not occur 0.9 0.7 0.2 x 0.9 x 0.7 = 0.126
Incorrect 0.2 Does occur 0.1 0.9 0.2 x 0.1 x 0.9 = 0.018
The probability of the Oil source being poor quality is Sum of above = 0.24
5.2 Analysis results
The effects of occurrence of a failure to any one of the MGB oil lubrication system
components or other influential triggers (the 15 primary factors) may be studied individually by
varying the input test probability from P = 0 (factor does not occur) to P = 1 (factor is certain to
occur) while keeping probabilities of all other factors as zero. In this manner, the output of the
model will show the influence of each factor in turn. The following highlights the effects of the
primary factor Maintenance procedures on MGB lubrication system. The sequence of testing
is carried out as follows:
i. All input test probabilities for the 15 primary factors are put at zero value except for the
Maintenance procedures factor which is assigned a value for input test probability that
varies from P = 0 to 1, with increment of 0.1.
ii. Values of main factors (Level C), main failures (Level B) and system failure (Level A) are
calculated at each of the input values for Maintenance procedures factor.
iii. Only events directly influenced by the Maintenance procedures will change values as its
input test probability is gradually increased. Other events are not influenced and continue to
be represented at zero values.
iv. Influences on levels C, B, and A are described by Figures 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
The maintenance procedures greatly influence both the Oil source degradation and the
Inadequate oil quantity main factors. Figure 4 shows how the probability of Oil source
degradation increases from 0 to 0.7 as the input probability is varied between 0 and 1. The
Maintenance procedures also influence the Oil contaminated main factor but to a lesser
degree. This is logical since the oil degradation even occurs due to many factors other than the
maintenance procedures (see model in Figure 3).
The model links Oil source degradation and Inadequate oil quantity with two factors from
level D (i.e. maintenance procedures and human factors), thus the share of influence of each of
these two factors is high. This may be compared with the overall influence imposed over the
Oil contaminated factor which is shared between four factors – Maintenance procedures,
Human error, Oil filtration and Oil debris.
Figure 4 - Influence of ‘Maintenance procedures’ on main influencing factors
The results from level C are then used in the model to generate results at level B, as shown in
Figure 5. The initial causal factor Maintenance procedures influences two main failures,
namely Inadequate oil quality and Inadequate oil quantity. In this representation, neither the
oil pressure nor monitoring functions are affected directly by the maintenance procedure. The
graph shows the probability for the two events increasing at different rates due to the different
influence parameters used in the model.
Figure 5 - Influence of ‘maintenance procedures’ on main failures
In the final step, Figure 6 shows the increasing influence of the maintenance procedures on
the overall lubrication system reliability (level A). As the input test probability of Maintenance
procedures is varied from 0 to 1, the overall lubrication system failure probability increases up
to a maximum value of 0.23. Even with a probability of one, defective maintenance procedures
do not lead to a corresponding certainty of lubrication failure due the variety of other factors in
play. Likewise the occurrence of a maintenance error (not shown here) would not necessarily
cause a total system failure.
Figure 6 - Influence of ‘Maintenance procedures’ on the probability of system failure
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This work has introduced an influence type model which may be used to evaluate the key
factors which contribute to MGB reliability. The fifteen primary factors have been selected
based on incident and accident reports, and an initial demonstration presented. Further work
will allow the model to be validated against in-service data, and generate sensitivity studies to
provide benefit to a variety of users. A design organisation can use it to weigh the relative
merits of different design proposals, e.g. installing back-up lubrication system, improving gear
integrity or changing oil specification. A regulatory authority could use this model as a means
of providing oversight of certification of gearbox lubrication systems. A helicopter
maintenance organisation could use such a model to assess the impact of maintenance
procedures and human factors on the overall system reliability.
In this paper, an example of model output is presented based on simulated data using just one
of the 15 primary factors. Further work is continuing to exercise and test the model to gain
additional insights into the factors that affect the lubrication system. In this way it will be
possible to “rank” the factors in order of priority (or influence) on the overall system. For
example, it would be useful to know which factors are the most important e.g. lubricant
viscosity, design features, maintenance frequency etc.
The ID approach has considerable merit since changing any of the parameters of the system
can have multiple “knock-on” effects. It will be possible to feed in other forms of data, rather
than simple (fixed) probability values, e.g. bearing reliability from Weibull analysis or fatigue
data for mechanical components. Hence the model will develop to be of great use to a variety of
users, and for a variety of purposes in the improvement of lubrication system reliability.
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